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A B S T R A C T
Theoretically, weather-index insurance is an effective risk reduction option for small-scale farmers in low
income countries. Renewed policy and donor emphasis on bridging gender gaps in development also
emphasizes the potential social safety net beneﬁts that weather-index insurance could bring to women
farmers who are disproportionately vulnerable to climate change risk and have low adaptive capacity. To
date, no quantitative studies have experimentally explored weather-index insurance preferences
through a gender lens, and little information exists regarding gender-speciﬁc preferences for (and
constraints to) smallholder investment in agricultural weather-index insurance. This study responds to
this gap, and advances the understanding of preference heterogeneity for weather-index insurance by
analysing data collected from 433 male and female farmers living on a climate change vulnerable coastal
island in Bangladesh, where an increasing number of farmers are adopting maize as a potentially
remunerative, but high-risk cash crop. We implemented a choice experiment designed to investigate
farmers’ valuations for, and trade-offs among, the key attributes of a hypothetical maize crop weather-
index insurance program that offered different options for bundling insurance with ﬁnancial saving
mechanisms. Our results reveal signiﬁcant insurance aversion among female farmers, irrespective of the
attributes of the insurance scheme. Heterogeneity in insurance choices could however not be explained
by differences in men’s and women’s risk and time preferences, or agency in making agriculturally
related decisions. Rather, gendered differences in farmers’ level of trust in insurance institutions and
ﬁnancial literacy were the key factors driving the heterogeneous preferences observed between men and
women. Efforts to fulﬁll gender equity mandates in climate-smart agricultural development programs
that rely on weather-index insurance as a risk-abatement tool are therefore likely to require a
strengthening of institutional credibility, while coupling such interventions with ﬁnancial literacy
programs for female farmers.
ã 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Weather related risks are major sources of income ﬂuctuations
for rural farm households in low-income countries. To buffer
against such risks, and to encourage investment in intensiﬁed and
high-value production, weather-index insurance (WII) is increas-
ingly suggested for smallholder farmers (Collier et al., 2009). In a
WII scheme, payouts occur when a speciﬁed weather parameter is
surpassed (e.g. seasonal rainfall falls below a speciﬁed threshold
indicative of drought status, or a storm passes a severity index* Corresponding author at: Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National
University of Singapore, 469C Bukit Timah Road, 259772 Singapore.
E-mail address: sonia.akter@nus.edu.sg (S. Akter).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.03.010
0959-3780/ã 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articindicating crop damage). The chosen threshold must be objective,
reliably measured, and strongly positively correlated with the
insured’s losses.
WII has been suggested as the “missing link” to de-risk
smallholder investment in intensiﬁed cropping (Johnson, 2013),
especially in the context of climate change (Collier et al., 2009).
Studies have however documented a number of important
limitations to WII. For example, ‘basis risk’ which arises due to
poor correlation between indices and individual farmers’ experi-
ences of crop losses, limits farmers’ initial or sustained investment
in WII (Clarke and Grenham, 2013). Binswanger-Mkhize (2012)
argues that most smallholder, farmers simply cannot afford to
invest in insurance, while larger farmers ‘self-insure’ against
risks through enterprise diversiﬁcation, crop storage, and social
safety nets. In some environments, farmers can self-insure againstle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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management practices. However, depending on the (opportunity)
costs of these practices and the price of WII, the latter may over
time crowd out the former, leading to less resilient farm
management practices in the long run (Müller et al., 2011).
While these fundamental problems constraining widespread
uptake remain inadequately addressed, WII projects are nonethe-
less operational in Africa, South and South East Asia, and Central
and South America, funded by a multitude of international
organizations (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012). Despite emphasis on
the business logic of WII, in practice many WII schemes remain
heavily subsidized by government and donor agencies, suffering
from a low rate of uptake that limits commercial viability (Cole
et al., 2013). WII programs also often fail to attract the target clients
most in need of protection against weather shocks, including
underrepresented women farmers (Giné et al., 2008; Delavallade
et al., 2015).
WII pilot programs place growing emphasis on attracting
women farmers (World Bank, 2015), as women in developing
countries tend to be among the poorest and the most vulnerable to
climate change and weather shocks (Ahmad, 2012; Kelkar, 2009).
Relative to their male counterparts, women experience gender
gaps with less access to ﬁnance, inputs, education, and associated
agricultural extension services. These factors consequently reduce
the productivity of women’s farms by 20–30% compared to those
managed by men (FAO, 2011). Eliminating gender gaps in
agriculture by ensuring female farmers’ adequate and equitable
access to agricultural ﬁnance, while also reducing investment
risks, is thus paramount to achieving the Sustainable Development
Goals to eradicate poverty and hunger, and to promote gender
equality through women’s empowerment.
This paper examines male and female maize farmers’ prefer-
ence heterogeneity for WII in Bangladesh, a low-lying deltaic
country located at the mouth of the Bay of Bengal in the northern
Indian Ocean, where interest in WII schemes is growing (Ahmed
and Hasemann, 2013). In 2010, women comprised 40% of
Bangladesh’s total agricultural labour force, with a 7% growth in
women’s participation in agriculture between 2005 and 2010 (BBS,
2011). Women’s ability to generate income in the agricultural
sector is nonetheless impeded by their low social empowerment,
in addition to weak community inﬂuence and a lack of control over
and access to income and resources (Sraboni et al., 2013). Women
in Bangladesh are also highly vulnerable to climate change risks
due to social norms, inequality and reproductive responsibilities
(WEDO, 2008; Ahmad, 2012). Their capacity to adapt to climate
change risks is also lower than men’s due to lack of access to
ﬁnancial services, limited economic opportunities, and limited
voice in decision making – especially in rural areas – where only
18 percent of adult women earn an income (WEDO, 2008; Ahmad,
2012). Against this backdrop, promoting gender equality and
women’s empowerment remains an important agricultural
development and climate change adaptation objective for many
organizations (Ahmad, 2012).
The Government of Bangladesh emphasizes diversifying and
increasing crop production in the coastal region to boost national
food and income security (MOA and FAO, 2013; Akter and Basher,
2014). By consequence, maize (Zea maize) is increasingly promoted
as a supplementary cash crop (sold into Bangladesh’s burgeoning
poultry and ﬁsh feed industries) within the southwestern and
south central coastal zone. Relative to other ﬁeld crops, optimizing
maize yield generally requires increased nutrient and labor inputs.
Maize has also been described as a risk-prone crop (Ali et al., 2009),
because in addition to the increased ﬁnancial costs of production,
the long-duration of most dry season maize cultivars extends their
growth period into the early monsoon season, when the risk of
crop damage resulting from severe weather events increases.Promotional efforts to expand maize cultivation in coastal
Bangladesh will therefore remain under-scaled if these weather
associated production risks are not addressed.
The objective of the present study is to explore the ways in
which gender and insurance product design inﬂuence the efﬁcacy
of inclusive WII schemes to de-risk crop production and encourage
cropping intensiﬁcation in the coastal south of Bangladesh, as a
case study informative for similar development efforts in South
Asia’s coastal zones. In order to adequately consider male and
female farmers’ preferences and constraints for WII options in this
risk-prone region, we conducted an attribute-based choice
experiment survey in which 433 male and female maize farmers
were queried on their preferences for a range of maize-based index
insurance options. Preferences were modeled with regard to risk
type, risk premium, payouts, trigger levels, and bundling options.
The latter denotes a savings component built into the hypothetical
insurance plan being offered, and represents one avenue for
enhancing the value proposition of WII for potential clients. This
study thus offers three contributions to the literature. First, it
identiﬁes both gender-speciﬁc needs for WII and barriers to WII
demand, in a country and a region characterized by considerable
climate change risks as deﬁned by the IPCC (2012) and low
women’s empowerment. Second, it tests farmers’ preferences for
non-traditional WII products that are bundled with savings in an
innovative way. Finally, it presents a framework for undertaking a
preliminary, ex-ante demand oriented assessment of a WII scheme
in the form of an attribute-based choice experiment, with
important implications for index insuring organizations, donors,
and policymakers.
2. Men, women, and weather index insurance
Previous studies in Bangladesh found that the market for a
standard, stand-alone weather micro-insurance is characterized
by low demand, poor governance, and lack of prospects for
commercial viability (Akter et al., 2009, 2011). Akter et al. (2011)
showed that these insurance schemes are likely to suffer 25% to
50% losses each year. Insurance delivery cost played a signiﬁcant
role in determining the commercial viability of the previously
tested insurance models (Akter et al., 2009, 2011). The low
transaction costs and reduced potential for moral hazard in WII
conversely makes it an attractive alternative (Akter, 2012) and
hence, interest in WII schemes is expanding in Bangladesh,
particularly in the coastal districts where vulnerability to climate
change is most acute (Akter and Mallick, 2013). The Asian
Development Bank (ADB), for example, is planning pilot WII
programs in the coastal region with national agricultural research
centers (Ahmed, 2013). The International Finance Corporation has
also completed a scoping study of WII investment opportunities in
Bangladesh (Ahmed, 2013), and Oxfam has implemented a meso-
level ﬂood index insurance pilot program in 14 districts (Ahmed
and Hasemann, 2013), though not in the coastal region.
Available evidence in India and Africa indicates that farmers’
voluntary participation in WII pilot programs has however been
much more modest than anticipated by their proponents (Giné
et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2013), with the uptake rate for WII among
female farmers considerably lower than their male counterparts
(Delavallade et al., 2015). Two mutually reinforcing problems have
been observed, namely: (1) a lack of ﬁnancial literacy among
poorer and less formally educated farmers (Clarke and Grenham,
2013), and (2) a lack of trust in the insurance provider to deliver
payouts (Carter et al., 2014; Giné et al., 2008). Additionally, risk-
averse households are less likely to purchase WII as a result of
uncertainty about the risk mitigation instrument that arises from
their lack of experience with such products and availability of self-
insurance or other alternative coping measures, provided their
S. Akter et al. / Global Environmental Change 38 (2016) 217–229 219opportunity costs are comparatively low (Giné et al., 2008; Quaas
and Baumgärtner, 2008; Baumgärtner and Quaas, 2009; Akter and
Fatema, 2011).
Critics also argue that WII and other rural ﬁnancial products are
generally designed for men, and that they fail to account for
gender-speciﬁc needs and constraints (Fletschner and Kenney,
2014). Lack of information about ﬁnancial institutions and a low
level of ﬁnancial literacy can impede women’s ability to beneﬁt
from ﬁnancial services (Cole et al., 2013). Even when women have
access to information, they may fail to fully comprehend the
conditions of complex ﬁnancial products like WII due to their lack
of conﬁdence and exposure to the formal and ofﬁcial language used
in most insurance contracts (Hung et al., 2012).
Men and women typically exhibit different personality traits,
particularly in terms of their willingness to take risks and to trust
people. In general, women tend to make less risky choices (Eckel
and Grossman, 2008), and are also less likely to trust others in
ﬁnancial trust games (Buchan et al., 2008), although women have
been shown to be more trustworthy compared to men. These
phenomena are attributed to gender differences in emotional
experiences of negative outcomes, especially lower utility result-
ing from bad outcomes experienced by women compared to men
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Although an individual’s risk orienta-
tion is expected to be correlated with their decision to trust (e.g.
risk averse individuals are less likely to place trust in an insurance
provider), empirical evidence suggests that individuals do not
consider trust as a problem of risk, but rather as a problem of
judgment (Eckel and Wilson, 2004). The correlation between trust
and risk has therefore been observed to be low and insigniﬁcant
(Eckel and Wilson, 2004). The existence of a gender gap in risk
preference and trust in ﬁnancial decisions in particular, therefore,
has different implications for men’s and women’s insurance
choices. The former implies that women tend to have a stronger
preference for insurance as it could help them to invest in riskier
but more proﬁtable enterprises. The later suggests that women’s
tendency towards distrust may hinder their participation in non-
traditional and innovative ﬁnancial products like WII, especially in
communities where fraudulent incidents are common.
Finally, projects seeking to improve WII tend to focus on
insurance product design and quality. Bundling WII with other
ﬁnancial products (e.g. savings) has consequently been proposed
(Carter et al., 2014; Stein and Tobacman, 2011). Bundled insurance-
savings products provide a positive payment in both good and bad
states of the world, making insurance clients feel that they are
receiving some return on their insurance investment, even without
calamity (Akter, 2012). Additionally, savings are commonly used as
a form of insurance to cover against idiosyncratic shocks (such as
health risks) both in developed and developing countries (Clark
and Mitchell, 2014). Given that women are more vulnerable to
health and environmental shocks (Clark and Mitchell, 2014),
bundling WII with savings may be more suitable to women’s needs
as it provides coverage against both idiosyncratic and covariate
shocks (Delavallade et al., 2015). However, bundling may also
potentially make the product more complicated, which could
discourage women clients’ participation if they have less ﬁnancial
literacy than men.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Choice experiments
Attribute-based choice experiments (CE) are widely used for
product designing and value elicitation in the absence of a real
market and revealed preference data. A CE constructs a hypotheti-
cal market by presenting respondents with a series of ‘choice sets’
comprised of paired alternative plans (e.g. ‘Plan A’, ‘Plan B’). Eachplan consists of the same attributes (typically three to ﬁve) that
deﬁne and describe the topic of interest (e.g. a WII plan). Each
attribute is deﬁned by two or more levels, and can be represented
by either a qualitative or a quantitative variable. The most notable
advantage of the CE technique is that it allows attribute trade-offs
and thus separately estimates the value of individual attributes of a
product or program (Hanley et al., 2001). However, the multiple
attributes and their levels may make the choice task complicated
by imposing signiﬁcant cognitive load on the respondents (Hanley
et al., 2001); the number of choice sets and attributes to present to
them are therefore important considerations in terms of limiting
response fatigue (Caussade et al., 2005; Rossi et al., 2011). The
following subsections describe the theoretical model and the
structure of the CE used for our study.
3.2. Theoretical model
The random utility maximization (RUM) model is the underly-
ing structural model encompassing discrete choice behaviour
(McFadden, 1974). The RUM model partitions indirect utility (Un)
into an observable (Vn) and an unobservable, or random,
component (en) for each respondent (n), as represented in Eq. (1):
Uni (Xni) = Vni (Xni) + eni (1)
In this model, an individual n faces a choice of one alternative
from a ﬁnite set C with a vector of attributes X. The probability (p)
that alternative i will be chosen is equal to the probability that the
utility gained from its choice is greater than or equal to the utilities
of choosing another alternative in C. Thus:
pni ¼ p Vni þ eni  Vnj þ enj; i 6¼ j; 8j 2 C
  ð2Þ
Assuming eni is identically and independently distributed and
follows a Gumbel distribution, pni can be estimated using the
conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974), such that:
pni ¼
exp bXnið ÞX
j2Cexp bXnj
  ð3Þ
where b is a vector of parameter coefﬁcients associated with X (i.e.
the attributes).
The treatment of unobserved preference heterogeneity plays a
crucial role in choice data analysis. In this study we employ the
Latent Class Model (LCM) that accommodates unobserved prefer-
ence heterogeneity at the group level through a discrete
distribution over unobservable latent classes of respondents
(Wedel and Kamakura, 2002). The LCM is typically preferred over
other commonly used models, such as the Random Parameter Logit
(RPL) model which treats unobserved heterogeneity using pre-
speciﬁed distribution (e.g. normal, triangular, lognormal) at the
individual level. The LCM is especially useful in new product
development and/or targeting research because it can identify
preferences and characteristics of distinct classes of respondents
(cf. Birol et al., 2009).
Using the LCM, Eq. (3) is rewritten as:
pnijs ¼
exp bsXni
 X
j2Cexp bsXnj
  ð4Þ
where s stands for segments (s = 1, . . . , S) and bs are segment-
speciﬁc utility coefﬁcients. Now consider the following latent
membership likelihood function M* that classiﬁes individuals into
one of the S segments:
Mns ¼ lsZn þ jns ð5Þ
where Z represents observed individual and household character-
istics (e.g. gender, education, farm size, insurance familiarity) and
Table 2
Index insurance trigger levels (intensity + duration) for three types of weather
related risks to maize production.
Trigger Inundation Windstorm Hailstorma
Level 1 Intensity = 15 cm
Duration = 3 days
Intensity = 75 km/h
Duration = 30 min
Intensity = 1 Tk coin
Duration = 5 min
Level 2 Intensity = 15 cm
Duration = 2 days
Intensity = 75 km/h
Duration = 15 min
Intensity = 1 Tk coin
Duration = 3 min
Level 3 Intensity = 10 cm
Duration = 3 days
Intensity = 60 km/h
Duration = 30 min
Intensity = any size
Duration = 5 min
a Hail size circumference was compared to the sphere equivalent of a
1 Bangladesh taka coin measuring 25 mm diameter.
220 S. Akter et al. / Global Environmental Change 38 (2016) 217–229jnsis the error term. The probability of an individual to belong to a
speciﬁc segment s can be described as:
pns ¼
exp lsZnð ÞX
s2SexpðlsZnÞ
ð6Þ
where ls are the segment speciﬁc parameters to be estimated.
Thus the unconditional probability that a randomly chosen
individual n chooses i is given by Eqs. (4) and (6) by means of
taking the expectation over all the S segments:
pni ¼
XS
s¼1
explsZnÞX
s2SexplsZnÞ
" #
expbsXni
X
j2CexpbsXnj

2
4
3
5 ð7Þ
The log likelihood function maximized to estimate ls and bs is
given by:
L ¼
XN
n¼1
X
i2j
dnilnpni ð8Þ
where N is sample size and dni equals 1 if an individual n choses i, or
0 otherwise.
3.3. Choice experiment design
Four key attributes were chosen after two preliminary focus
group discussions (FGDs) with male and female farmers in the
study area (Table 1), including (1) Risk Hazard Type (HAZ), (2)
Deposit (DEP), (3) Bad Time Payment (BTP) (payment received by the
insured when a threshold surpasses an index indicative of crop
damage), and (4) Guaranteed Good Time Payment (GTP) (payment
received by the insured even if no crop damage occurred). The
levels of these attributes were chosen after interviews with local
government, NGO ofﬁcials, extension workers, village leaders and
CIMMYT scientists. The attributes and their levels were ﬁnalized
after two pre-testing.
Three implicit bundling options were presented by the variable
levels of GTP: No (GTP = 0), Partial (0 < GTP < Deposit), and Full
Return (GTP = Deposit). Together, Partial and Full Return represent
the partial and full savings component of a bundled plan
respectively, while No Return implies a stand-alone insurance
plan. No Return plans contain relatively lower deposits, in contrast
to the Full Return and Partial Return plans (Table 1). Technically, the
interest earned from the deposit of the latter two plans pays off the
insurance premium. This means that the net deposit (i.e. DEP–GTP)Table 1
Choice experiment attributes and their associated levels (all monetary valu
Bundling options Attributes 
No Return Hazard 
Depositb
Guaranteed good time paymen
Bad time payment 
Partial Return Hazard 
Depositc
Guaranteed good time paymen
Bad time payment 
Full Return Hazard 
Depositd
Guaranteed good time paymen
Bad time payment 
Note: Nominal interest rate on a general savings account in Bangladesh var
a Tk 77 = 1 USD.
b Net deposit (i.e. deposit–good time payment) = 100, 200, 300, 500, 800
c Net deposit = 100, 200, 300, 500, 600.
d Net deposit = 0.under each of these schemes were not substantially different from
each other.
Based on preliminary FGD results, we represented the risk of
crop damage by inundation, windstorms, and hailstorms, each
being described via an associated trigger level constructed by
combining two weather parameter thresholds (Appendix A in
Supplementary material). Table 2 lists a set of three such
composite indices constructed for each risk type. We relied upon
the best-estimates of experienced agronomists to identify these
trigger levels due to the absence of historical maize damage data in
the study area. Each respondent was presented with only one set of
trigger levels for all risk types, but different respondents were
randomly shown one of the three sets of trigger levels presented in
Table 2.
Although the provider is an important attribute of insurance
design (Brouwer and Akter, 2010), this attribute was kept ﬁxed to
limit CE complexity (Caussade et al., 2005). Local NGOs currently
operating in the study area were mentioned as the most likely
provider of this insurance scheme (Appendix B in Supplementary
material). This was deemed appropriate because of three reasons.
First, previous research identiﬁed NGOs as the most suitable
institution for insurance delivery due to their access to a large
client network, infrastructural facilities across even the most
remote parts of Bangladesh, a greater degree of trust and
credibility among clients, and pre-existing information on client
portfolios and risk history (Akter et al., 2011). Second, prospective
WII pilot projects consider NGOs as the most potent insurance
delivery agents due to the above mentioned factors (ADB, 2013).
Finally, no evidence of distrust against the NGOs was found in the
study area during the FGDs and key informant interviews.es are presented in Bangladesh taka, Tka).
Levels
Inundation, Windstorm, Hailstorm
100, 200, 300, 500, 800, 1000
t 0
1000, 1500, 2000, 3000, 5000
Inundation, Windstorm, Hailstorm
500, 800, 1000, 2000, 2500, 3000
t 200, 800, 1800, 2000, 2500, 2800
2000, 3000, 4000, 5000
Inundation, Windstorm, Hailstorm
800, 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000, 4000
t 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000, 4000
1800, 2000, 2500, 3000, 3500, 4000, 5000
ies between 6 and 9% (Bangladesh Bank, 2015).
, 1000.
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constructing a Bayesian efﬁcient design (‘Db-optimal efﬁcient
design’), the CE design used for this study includes 24 choice
combinations randomly divided into four blocks (six choice
questions in each block); thus, each respondent was randomly
presented with one of the four blocks. Each choice set included two
‘unlabeled’ or ‘generic’ options, plus an opt-out alternative (‘None’)
representing the status quo (Fig. 1). Respondents were ﬁrst
introduced to the hypothetical scheme through a detailed scenario
description (Appendix B in Supplementary material), followed by
an explanation of the corresponding trigger levels. Only then were
they presented with the choice sets. Enumerators also read a
‘cheap talk’ script (Appendix C in Supplementary material) to
reduce hypothetical bias (Cummings and Taylor, 1999).
3.4. Choice experiment implementation
A household survey was conducted in three sub-districts of
Bhola island, namely, Bhola Sadar, Borhanuddin and Daulatkhan
(Fig. 2). Maize has been promoted in these sub-districts by a large
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and USAID-funded project (the
Cereal Systems Initiative for South Asia, or CSISA), and the USAID
Mission supported CSISA expansion project in Bangladesh (CSISA-
BD), since the winter season of 2011–12. All listed maize farmers,
male and female, in the three sub-districts were considered as the
sample frame; farmer lists were obtained from the local ofﬁces of
the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE), CSISA, and local
NGOs. Women farmers comprised 20% of the sample frame. In this
context, ‘women farmers’ refer to women who were encouraged by
extension agents to enlist themselves as farmers with the local
NGO or the local DAE ofﬁces. Such enlisting helps the NGOs and
DAE to fulﬁll their women beneﬁciary targets. They are not
necessarily household heads, but are commonly the primary
female decision makers in each household. In total, 433 fullyFig. 1. Example of a choice experiment question format structured face-to-face interviews (70% men and 30% women)
were conducted by 20 local enumerators (14 male, 6 female, the
latter primarily interviewing female respondents) between 10 and
28 June 2014 (see Appendix D in Supplementary material for more
survey details). Women were slightly oversampled to reﬂect the
standard (minimum) 30% target of reaching female beneﬁciaries
by development projects (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
2008).
3.5. WII model speciﬁcation
For the present study, the observed component of the indirect
utility function is speciﬁed as:
V = b1 ASC + b2 DEP + b3 BTP + b4 GTP + b5 (DEP  Hail)
+ b6 (BTP  Hail) + b7 (GTP  Hail) + b8 (DEP  Wind) + b9
 (BTP  Wind) + b10 (GTP  Wind) (9)
The expression ‘ASC’ refers to the alternative speciﬁc constant,
which equals zero for the status quo, and 1 for the WII plans. The
ASC variable absorbs and isolates the (non-zero) mean utility
associated with unobserved attributes of the insurance options
that are not explicitly included in the CE. Two of the hazard
alternatives (Hail, Wind) appear in the model as an interaction
variable with the other principal attributes (DEP,BTP, GTP); the
third alternative (Inundation) is the base category.
In addition to Eq. (9), a separate model is speciﬁed to test
various hypotheses with respect to bundling options (k) and trigger
levels:
V = bk ASCk + b2 DEP + b3 BTP + b4 GTP + b5 (DEP  Hail)
+ b6 (BTP  Hail) + b7 (GTP  Hail) + b8 (DEP  Wind) + b9
 (BTP  Wind) + b10 (GTP*Wind) + bz (Z  ASCk) (10)
In Eq. (10), ASC equals zero for the status quo and 1 for the
bundling options (i.e. Full, Partial and No Return), TRG is a dummyshown to farmers (hail or windstorm crop damage).
Fig. 2. Sampled maize farming households on Bhola Island, Bangladesh.
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economic and demographic characteristics. The interaction of
respondent-speciﬁc characteristics with the ASC in the utility
function enables the identiﬁcation of intra-segment heterogeneity
in a LCM model.
3.6. Semi-quantitative follow-up study
To complement the quantitative data, a semi-qualitative study
was conducted in October 2014 in which 121 farmers (72 men and
49 women) were randomly selected from the initial sample of
433 respondents. Each participant ﬁrst attended a fully structured
personal interview followed by a FGD. To refresh participants’
memories, the insurance scheme, bundling options, and the
individual-speciﬁc choice questions from the original CE survey
were revisited during the personal interview. Additionally,
respondents were queried regarding their views and opinions
about the proposed insurance scheme, their past experience with
fraudulent incidents, and their preferred insurance service
provider. A total of 15 FGDs were conducted, with eight farmers
participating in each FGD, conducted separately for male and
female farmers.4. Results
4.1. Choice experiment study
4.1.1. Farmer statistics
Only three percent of the sampled women did not have any
active engagement in maize farming. The remaining 97% spent, on
average, 19–31 person-days per season per maize cropped area,
performing land preparation, crop establishment, weeding,
harvesting, shelling and drying. Maize area averaged 0.13 hectares.
Only 10% of the female respondents, as opposed to 74% of the male
respondents, had the authority to make agricultural decisions on
their own. The households represented by a woman were more
likely to belong to minority religious communities (p < 0.01), and
on average owned signiﬁcantly (p < 0.001) smaller parcels of land
and non-land assets than the households represented by men
(Table 3). Although their costs of production were not signiﬁcantly
different, they earned signiﬁcantly (p < 0.001) lower revenues (and
thus proﬁt), which reﬂects a lack of market access for the
households represented by a woman. Compared to men, a
signiﬁcantly (p < 0.01) smaller proportion of women completed
high school and a larger proportion of women were unfamiliar
with the concept of insurance (p < 0.10). Women were on average
Table 3
Description of the sampled households and respondents.
Variable Male
(n = 299)
Female
(n = 134)
Diff. Z or x2 value P
Household characteristics
Religion (non-Muslim) (%) 1% 7% 6% 9.19 <0.01
Household size 6.58 5.57 1 4.13 <0.001
Cultivable land (decimal) 103 45 58 4.67 <0.001
Non-land asset (in US$) 1973 1245 728 3.28 <0.001
Average size of maize farm in decimal (hectare) 31 (0.14) 26 (0.11) 4.72 1.17 0.30
Cost (median) of production of per hectare of maize farm in 2014 (in USD) 476 487 11 20478a 0.71
Revenue (median) earned from per hectare of maize farm in 2014 (in USD) 1191 1016 175 16189a <0.001
Proﬁt (median) earned from per hectare of maize farm in 2014 (in USD) 667 476 190 15925a <0.001
Maize cultivation experience (years) 3.50 3.0 0.47 2.50 <0.05
Formal savings account (%) 43 49 6 1.40 0.30
Formal credit account (%) 42 54 12 4.72 <0.05
Purchased insurance (%) 21 22 1 0.018 0.88
Respondent characteristics
Mean age (years) 45 35 9.5 7.40 <0.001
High school and above (%) 35 22 13 7.33 <0.01
Head of the household (%) 87 23 64 171 <0.001
No familiarity with insurance (%) 53 63 10 3.70 <0.10
Risk aversion coefﬁcientb 0.73 0.91 0.23 2.45 <0.05
Time preferencec
(% with discount rate >70%)
86 68 18 21 <0.001
a Mann-Whitney U statistics.
b Assuming constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), u yð Þ ¼ y1u=1  u, the curvature of the utility function u represents the degree of risk aversion. This was determined by
calculating the value of u that would make a respondent indifferent between the chosen gamble and the two adjacent gambles (Eckel and Grossman, 2008). The mean of the
risk-aversion coefﬁcient is 0.78, which is consistent with CRRA risk-aversion coefﬁcients for farmers in developing countries (Olbrich et al., 2012).
c The discount rate is determined solving the value function v M0ð Þ ¼ 11þrv Mtð Þ. M0 is the present value of Mt offered at time t with discount rate r.
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(p < 0.001) lower discount rate (i.e., were more patient) than men.
4.1.2. Farmers’ preferences for WII
The results obtained from the LCM speciﬁcation in Eqs. (9) and
(10) are presented in Models 1 and 2, respectively, of Table 4.
Considering the log likelihood, pseudo R2, Bozdogan AkaikeInfor-
mationCriterion (AIC3) and Bayesian InformationCriterion (BIC)
(Appendix E in Supplementary material), a two-segment model
was considered optimum for analysis (Andrews and Currim, 2003).
Over half of the sample (59%) belonged to the ﬁrst segment; the
rest (41%) belonged to Segment 2. In Model 1, the alternative
speciﬁc constant for Segment 1, or ASCNSQ|1, is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.001), implying that Segment
1 respondents tended to choose the status quo. Conversely, in
Segment 2, ASCNSQ|2, is positive and signiﬁcant (p < 0.001),
indicating that these respondents were signiﬁcantly more likely
to choose an insured state. Given such results, we labelled
Segments 1and 2 as Insurance Averse and Insurance Favoured,
respectively.
In both segments of Model 1, the coefﬁcients of DEP, GTP and BTP
are signiﬁcant (p < 0.001); the signs of the coefﬁcients of DEP, GTP
and BTP conform to a priori theoretical expectations of a lower
demand for inundation based WII (the baseline alternative) due to
a higher deposit requirement and higher demand due to higher
good and bad time payments. In Segment 1 (Model 1), the
coefﬁcients of the interaction terms between DEP, BTP, GTP and Hail
and Wind indicate signiﬁcant preference heterogeneity with
respect to hazard type among the Insurance Averse respondents.
For Hail based WII, clearly, the demand is signiﬁcantly lower than
Inundation based WII. For Wind based WII, the net change in utility
from the Inundation based WII was unclear at this stage (implicit
price estimates in Section 4.1.3 provide clariﬁcation). In Segment 2,
conversely, the coefﬁcients of the interaction terms between DEP,
BTP, GTP and Hail and Wind are not statistically different than zero,implying that the members of the Insurance Favored group were
equally likely to choose Inundation, Hail and Wind based WII.
The segment membership coefﬁcients suggest that female
respondents were signiﬁcantly (p < 0.001) more likely to be
Insurance Averse than the male respondents. Risk preference was
an important determinant of segment membership (p < 0.10), with
a positive sign which conforms to previous empirical evidence that
risk averse individuals are more likely to be insurance averse (cf.
Giné et al., 2008). In addition, relatively wealthier households, and
households that maintained a savings account with a formal
institution (an indicator of ﬁnancial literacy), were signiﬁcantly
(p < 0.05 and <0.01, respectively) more likely to belong to the
Insurance Favoured group. The coefﬁcients of all of the other
variables (e.g. spouses’ presence, time preference, insurance
familiarity) were statistically insigniﬁcant.
Model 2 of Table 4 decomposes insurance preference according
to bundling options, controlling for trigger levels and respondents’
socio-economic and demographic characteristics. For the Insurance
Averse group, respondents were signiﬁcantly less likely (p < 0.001)
to choose a Full Return scheme as opposed to the No and Partial
Return schemes and the status quo. For the Insurance Favoured
group, the coefﬁcients of the No, Partial, and Full Return schemes
are positive and statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.01 and 0.10,
respectively) with the utility parameter associated with the No-
Return scheme substantially, although not signiﬁcantly, higher
than the rest. These ﬁndings imply that the Full Return scheme was
the least popular option among the Insurance Averse group, and
that the No Return scheme was the most popular among the
Insurance Favoured group, respectively. Trigger levels did not
inﬂuence insurance choice in Segment 1. The Insurance Favoured
respondents who were shown Trigger 2 and 3 (comprising
relatively lower weather parameter thresholds than Trigger 1),
were signiﬁcantly more likely to pay a higher net deposit
compared to respondents who were shown Trigger 1.
Table 4
Latent class logit model regression results.
Variables Description Model 1 Model 2
Segment 1
(Insurance averse)
Segment 2
(Insurance favored)
Segment 1
(Insurance averse)
Segment 2
(Insurance favored)
Mean of utility parameters (Parentheses indicate SE)
ASC Alternative speciﬁc constant. Choice of an insured
state = 1, otherwise = 0
0.53***
(0.15)
0.99***
(0.18)
– –
Full-Return Choice of a Full-Return scheme = 1, otherwise = 0 – – 2.98***
(0.61)
0.91*
(0.54)
Partial-Return Choice of a Partial-Return scheme = 1, otherwise = 0 – – 0.03
(0.55)
1.02*
(0.55)
No-Return Choice of a No-Return scheme = 1, otherwise = 0 – – 0.28
(0.38)
1.22***
(0.41)
b2 (DEP
a) Deposit 0.005***
(0.001)
0.002**
(0.0008)
0.006***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.0009)
b3 (BTP
a) Bad time payment 0.0007***
(0.0002)
0.0005***
(0.0002)
0.0006***
(0.0002)
0.0005**
(0.0002)
b4 (GTP
a) Good time payment 0.0035***
(0.0006)
0.0017***
(0.0007)
0.005***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.0007)
b5 ðHail  DEPÞ Interaction between hailstorm insurance and deposit 0.0022
(0.0015)
0.0003
(0.0013)
0.0003*
(0.0002)
0.0004
(0.001)
b6 ðHail  BTPÞ Interaction between hailstorm insurance and bad time
payment
0.0008**
(0.0004)
0.00015
(0.0003)
0.001**
(0.0004)
0.0004
(0.0003)
b7 ðHail  GTPÞ Interaction between hailstorm insurance and good time
payment
0.0015
(0.001)
0.57E-04
(0.001)
0.002*
(0.001)
3.24E-04
(0.001)
b8 ðWind  DEPÞ Interaction between wind insurance and deposit 0.0026
***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
b9 ðWind  BTPÞ Interaction between wind insurance and bad time
payment
0.0006***
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0005**
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
b10 ðWind  GTPÞ Interaction between wind insurance and good time
payment
0.002**
(0.0008)
0.001
(0.001)
0.002**
(0.0008)
0.001
(0.0007)
TRG2b (DEP-GTP) Interaction between trigger level 2 and net deposit – – 0.0003
(0.0005)
0.001**
(0.0005)
TRG3b (DEP-GTP) Interaction between trigger level 3 and net deposit – – 0.0001
(0.0005)
0.0015***
(0.0005)
Intra-segment (conditional) heterogeneity (Model 2 only)
Time  Full-Return Interaction between time preference (Discount rate > 70% = 1) and full return urn scheme 0.42
(0.41)
0.60
(0.38)
Time  Partial-Return Interaction between time preference (Discount rate > 70% = 1) and partial return scheme 0.22
(0.37)
0.61
(0.38)
Time  No-Return Interaction between time preference (Discount rate > 70% = 1) and no return scheme 0.24
(0.35)
0.03
(0.30)
Risk  Full-Return Interaction between risk coefﬁcient and full return scheme 0.42***
(0.15)
0.12
(0.17)
Risk  Partial-Return Interaction between risk coefﬁcient and partial return scheme 0.04
(0.16)
0.12
(0.18)
Risk  No-Return Interaction between risk coefﬁcient and no return scheme 0.02
(0.10)
0.08
(0.15)
Female  Full-Return Interaction between female and full return scheme 0.50
(0.30)
1.08**
(0.45)
Female  Partial-Return Interaction between female and partial return scheme 0.75**
(0.31)
1.75***
(0.46)
Female  No-Return Interaction between female and no return scheme 0.72**
(0.29)
0.37
(0.36)
Segment probability modelc
Familiarity Respondent is familiar with insurance = 1, otherwise = 0 0.38
(0.32)
0.0 0.43
(0.31)
0.0
Female Female = 1, otherwise = 0 2.10***
(0.41)
0.0 0.90*
(0.47)
0.0
Age Respondent’s age (in years) 0.002
(0.01)
0.0 0.003
(0.01)
0.0
Literacy Respondent has some literacy = 1, otherwise = 0 0.28
(0.36)
0.0 0.34
(0.34)
0.0
Risk preference Coefﬁcient of risk aversion 0.30*
(0.17)
0.0 0.33*
(0.17)
0.0
Time preference Discount rate (>70%) = 1, otherwise = 0 0.09
(0.37)
0.0 0.45
(0.44)
0.0
Purchased insurance Respondents purchased insurance = 1, otherwise = 0 0.17
(0.37)
0.0 0.06
(0.37)
0.0
Formal savings Respondent maintains a savings account with a formal
institution = 1, otherwise = 0
1.20***
(0.30)
0.0 1.04***
(0.30)
0.0
Credit Respondent borrowed money from a formal
institution = 1, otherwise = 0
0.20
(0.27)
0.0 0.12
(0.27)
0.0
Spouse Spouse was present during the interview = 1,
otherwise = 0
0.21
(0.36)
0.0 0.13
(0.36)
0.0
224 S. Akter et al. / Global Environmental Change 38 (2016) 217–229
Table 4 (Continued)
Variables Description Model 1 Model 2
Segment 1
(Insurance averse)
Segment 2
(Insurance favored)
Segment 1
(Insurance averse)
Segment 2
(Insurance favored)
Proﬁt Proﬁt earned from 33 decimal of maize in 2014 (in
thousand Tk)
0.02
(0.02)
0.0 0.02
(0.016)
0.0
Asset Value of non-land asset owned by the household (in
thousand Tk)
0.003**
(0.001)
0.0 0.002**
(0.001)
0.0
Constant 0.16
(0.80)
0.0 0.31
(0.80)
0.0
Segment probability 0.59 0.41 0.55 0.45
Model statistics
Group number 433 433
Log likelihood 2368 2324
LR x2 919 (df = 33, p < 0.0001) 1007 (df = 59, p <0.0001)
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.16 0.18
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
a Base category = Inundation.
b Base category = Trigger level 1.
c The membership coefﬁcients for Segment 2 were normalized to zero.
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scheme as much as men, but conversely disliked the Partial and No
Return schemes signiﬁcantly more than men. In the Insurance
Favoured group, compared to men, women were signiﬁcantly less
likely to opt for the Full and Partial Return schemes. No signiﬁcant
difference was observed between men and women in terms their
preference for the No Return scheme in the Insurance Favoured
group. Among other factors, risk-averse individuals in the
Insurance Averse group were signiﬁcantly (p < 0.001) more likely
to choose the Full Return option. Time preference was not a
signiﬁcant determinant of intra-group preference heterogeneity.Table 5
Mean implicit prices (IP)a for weather index insurance in US$/season/bighab, by weath
Model 2, Segment 1 (Insurance Averse) 
Hazard IPBTP IPGTP IPTotal
(=IPBTP + IPG
Flood 2.00d
(1.50–2.50)
9.65e
(8.97–10.34)
11.64
(11.17–12.10
Hail 0.30f
(4.01–3.43)
10.48g
(8.16–12.68)
10.19
(8.30–12.23
Wind 0.83h
(0.60–2.26)
10.15i
(8.95–11.34)
11.00
(9.84–12.12
a Implicit prices for Taka 1,000 (US$13) worth of remuneration either as compensatio
combined.
b One bigha = 0.134 ha. = 0.33 acre.
c Conﬁdence intervals were estimated using the Wald procedure (Delta Method).
d b3j1b2j1.
e b4j1b2j1.
f ðb3j1þb6j1Þ
b2j1þb5j1ð Þ.
g ðb4j1þb7j1Þ
b2j1þb5j1ð Þ.
h ðb3j1þb9j1Þ
b2j1þb8j1ð Þ.
i ðb4j1þb10j1Þ
b2j1þb8j1ð Þ.
j b3j2b2j2.
k b4j2b2j2 .
l ðb3j2þb6j2Þ
b2j2þb5j2ð Þ.
m ðb4j2þb7j2Þ
b2j2þb5j2ð Þ.
n ðb3j2þb9j2Þ
b2j2þb8j2ð Þ.
o ðb4j2þb10j2Þ
b2j2þb8j2ð Þ.4.1.3. Implicit prices
The general formula for calculating marginal willingness to pay,
or implicit price (IP), of a given attribute from a choice experiment
is IP = (bx/by), where bx is the coefﬁcient of attribute x and by is
the coefﬁcient of the variable representing the payment vehicle.
Using the parameter estimates for Model 1 (Eq. (9)) shown in
Table 4, we estimated implicit prices for the hypothetical WII, and
for each hazard (Table 5). IPBTP in Table 5 refers to the mean
willingness to pay for a scheme that offers zero “good time
payment”, but conversely with 1000 Taka ($13) compensation
following a “bad time” event. The Insurance Averse group’s
willingness to pay for a standalone Inundation based WII waser hazard and segment (95% conﬁdence interval in the parenthesisc).
Model 2, Segment 2 (Insurance Favored)
TP)
IPBTP IPGTP IPTotal
(=IPBTP + IPGTP)
)
3.12j
(1.87–4.38)
10.58k
(8.9512.21)
13.70
(12.12–15.28)
)
3.60l
(2.81–4.36)
9.00m
(8.12–9.90)
12.58
(12.00–13.15)
)
3.85n
(1.945.76)
9.30o
(7.3311.26)
13.15
(11.00–15.33)
n for a “bad time” event or for savings returned during “good times”, and for both
Table 6
Farmers’ experiences of fraud and insurance choice.
Within Male
(%)
Within Female
(%)
x2 value
Experienced fraud 27 38 1.54 (p < 0.25)
Fraud victims’ frequency of status quo choice 36 66 –
Non-victims’ frequency of status quo choice 34 65 –
x2 value (p < 0.001) 0.10 (p <0.80) 0.01 (p <0.90)
Experience of fraud impacted choice 0 56 9 (p <0.001)
Experience of fraud impacted choice and % of status quo choice – 72 –
Experience of fraud did not impact choice and % of status quo choice 36 58 7 (p < 0.001)
x2 value – 2.105 (p < 0.15)
226 S. Akter et al. / Global Environmental Change 38 (2016) 217–229$2, signiﬁcantly (p < 0.001) different than zero, while this group’s
willingness to pay for standalone Hail and Wind based WII was
considerably lower than the inundation based WII, and not
signiﬁcantly different than zero. Conversely, the Insurance
Favoured group had positive and signiﬁcantly (p < 0.001) higher
willingness to pay for standalone insurance for all hazard based
WII than that of Insurance Averse group. The implicit prices for
different hazard based WII among the Insurance Favoured group
were not signiﬁcantly different from each other.
When a “guaranteed good time payment” or a savings
component of 1,000 Taka ($13) is added to the WII, the implicit
prices unequivocally increase for both groups and all hazard types
(i.e. IPGTP in Table 5). Interestingly, for the Insurance Averse group,
the total WTP (i.e. IPTotal in Table 5) for a WII that offers
$13 payment both in good and bad states of the world was
signiﬁcantly (p < 0.001) lower than $13. This implies that this
group not only wants their full deposit to be returned, but also
expected a positive return from their savings. This ﬁnding exhibits
the Insurance Averse group’s willingness to accept compensation
for paying a higher deposit, which is consistent with the negative
sign of the utility parameter associated with Full Return scheme in
Segment 1 of Model 2 (Table 4). The Insurance Favoured group’s
total willingness to pay to receive $13 payment in both good and
bad states of the world was not signiﬁcantly different than
$13, implying that they are willing to pay roughly at least $13 to
receive the same amount in both good and bad states of the world.
4.2. Semi-qualitative follow-up study results
One hypothesis for low insurance demand in the study area was
that a lack of trust in the insurance institution limits investments.
Re-sampled farmers were therefore asked speciﬁc questions about
their past experiences with ﬁnancial fraud during the follow-up
study. About a third of the respondents had been victims of
ﬁnancial fraud in the past (Table 6). One widely mentioned case of
fraud involved accusations against a small organization, no longer
active in Bhola, that offered a high return savings scheme. The
alleged organization vacated Bhola after collecting money from
their clients for two years without making any payouts. No
signiﬁcant difference was observed between men and women inTable 7
Experience of fraud and risk preference.
Risk preference coefﬁcients
Experienced fraud 
Male 0.97 
Female 0.56 
Fraud exp. impacted choice 
Male – 
Female 0.59 terms of their likelihood of experiencing fraudulent incidents
(Chi2 = 1.5; p = 0.21). Interestingly, 10 out of the 37 fraud victims
who admitted that their prior fraud experience negatively
inﬂuenced their decisions during the CE survey were women.
These women also tended to be more likely (p = 0.15) to choose the
status quo during the CE survey (72% of the cases), when compared
to the remaining eight female fraud victims who stated their
decisions were not inﬂuenced by their past experience of fraud
(58% of the cases). To test whether the experience of fraud made
people more or less risk averse, we compared the risk coefﬁcients
of the male and female victims and non-victims (Table 7). The
average risk coefﬁcients of respondents whose insurance choice
was affected by fraud were not signiﬁcantly different (p = 0.42),
suggesting that a lack of trust in insurance was not particularly
motivated by risk aversion. This ﬁnding is consistent with previous
empirical evidence regarding low and insigniﬁcant correlation
between trust and risk as shown by Eckel and Wilson (2004).
This lack of institutional trust raises the question of who a
preferred and trusted insurance provider could be. Most respond-
ents (44%) stated they would place their trust in a government
bank followed by NGOs (40%). This ﬁnding suggests no speciﬁc bias
against NGOs, which were referred as the most likely insurance
providers during the CE survey. Islamic banks were the third most
preferred insurance provider, voted by 15% of the respondents,
while private insurance companies were the least preferred option.
No signiﬁcant differences were observed between men and
women, or victims and non-victims, in terms of insurance provider
preferences. However, women who stated that their choices were
affected by a previous fraudulent incident predominantly opted for
the government bank as their most preferred insurance provider.
Low insurance demand was also inﬂuenced by aspects of the
insurance product which were not explicitly captured by the CE
attributes. Most participants – men in particular – stated that they
did not like the core principle of WII, i.e. that compensation payout
is linked with one or multiple weather parameters that are difﬁcult
to measure or understand from the farmer’s perspective. They
expressed concern about the type of methodology used, and what
could happen if the methodological approach failed to measure the
parameters accurately. Farmers also feared that such products
were likely to be associated with basis risk. For example, if a strongDid not experience fraud Z value
0.83 0.54 (p < 0.60)
1.00 2.3 (p < 0.05)
Fraud exp. did not impact choice Z value
0.97 –
0.52 0.66 (p = 0.60)
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low risk to crop damage by local agronomists, farmers nonetheless
thought they could still suffer considerable damage due to maize
lodging or stem breakage, although under this circumstance they
would not receive a payout. Instead, they preferred the traditional
insurance scheme where the payout depends on actual incurred
and directly quantiﬁed damage, with damage assessment achieved
through physical veriﬁcation by the insurer. When given a choice
between WII versus traditional insurance, 55% of the respondents,
with no signiﬁcant difference across men and women, chose
traditional insurance over WII.
Finally, low insurance demand was also affected by low
ﬁnancial literacy. Both male (25%) and female (75%) respondents
found the conditions of the proposed WII schemes to be
complicated. In particular, female farmers struggled the most to
comprehend the trigger level and compensation. Most women
(75%) implied that since they are not highly active outside the
household, and because they lacked higher education, they
customarily rely on male household members to make ﬁnancial
decisions. Although in some cases male family members were
present during the CE interviews, and thus occasionally helped
women understand WII, a lack of self-conﬁdence was still clearly
evident and most women farmers still found the concept to be
abstract and complex.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
Policy and donor investment prioritization efforts in
Bangladesh focus attention on climate change adaptation and
gender equitable agricultural development in the coastal region
(MOA and FAO, 2013). Interest in the ways in which WII programs
could help achieve these goals is consequently growing, with a
number of preliminary feasibility studies underway by donor,
research, and investment agencies (Ahmed and Hasemann, 2013;
Ahmed, 2013; ADB, 2013). None of these efforts however explicitly
address the potential for gender differences in smallholders’
preferences for WII, instead relying on the a priori supposition that
WII will be equally accepted by men and women farmers, in line
with suggestions elsewhere (cf. World Bank, 2015).
In response to this problem, our CE survey results showed
evidence of a substantial gender gap in WII demand, with
important implications for the promotion of WII programs in
agricultural development and climate change adaptation efforts.
Although women were signiﬁcantly more risk averse, supporting
Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008), and had a lower discount rate,
these factors could not fully explain the gender gap. A follow-up
study designed with a sub-sample of the original choice
experiment participants revealed important differences across
gender with respect to institutional trust, helping to qualitatively
explain the gender difference in WII choice to some extent.
Although women were not more or less susceptible to fall prey to
ﬁnancial frauds than men, women who were previous victims of
ﬁnancial fraud were more likely to be skeptical about the
credibility of the proposed insurance scheme in delivering payouts
than were men, despite similar experience. This ﬁnding can be
partly explained in light of the theories of the ﬁnancial economics
literature which suggest women tend to feel more regretful than
men due to poorly made ﬁnancial decisions in the past, and thus
exhibit more loss aversion behavior when it comes to making
future investment decisions (Arora and Kumari, 2015). The women
fraud victims further afﬁrmed a strong preference for government
banks as their preferred insurance provider during the follow-up
study, supporting previous assertions of the importance of
assuring institutional credibility as a precondition for WII
adoption, particularly in environments characterized by poorgovernance and weak institutional accountability (Carter et al.,
2014; Giné et al., 2008).
The follow-up study results also suggested that both men and
women found WII to be conceptually complex. While women were
signiﬁcantly less familiar with insurance (indicative of a low level
of ﬁnancial literacy), men were also relatively unfamiliar–although
they understood the mechanism following adequate brieﬁng by
enumerators. Most women respondents struggled to comprehend
the trigger levels and compensation mechanisms in particular. This
implies that, due to their relative lack of experience and exposure
to ﬁnancial matters, women generally failed to understand the
formal language commonly used to describe such insurance
schemes. This conclusion should however be carefully interpreted
due to the time difference between the initial CE and follow-up
study, although our efforts to brief each follow-up study
participant by providing a summary of the initial experiment
and their chosen insurance preferences should have minimized
any inconsistency. Further research is needed to test the ways in
which proposed WII schemes are designed and communicated, as
our results suggest that they should be simple as possible for the
intended clients – particularly women – to understand and enroll
in.
We tested the potential of an innovative insurance-savings
component to boost farmers’ interest in, and acceptance of WII, for
women in particular through the CE survey. A “full return” based
WII-savings bundle was designed to pay back the insurance
premium to the purchaser, with the interest earned on the
premium covering the insurer’s cost. Such a plan required a high
premium deposit, however, since this is the only way to assure
ﬁnancial viability. This “full return” plan was the least popular
option among the Insurance Averse group, because the initial
deposit required was substantially higher than the alternative
plans. There was no evidence to suggest that women preferred “full
return” plans more than men. Even within the members of the
Insurance Favoured group, who were in general supportive of all the
bundling options, women were particularly averse to the bundled
WII-savings schemes. Hence, our ﬁndings suggest that overall
there is likely little promise for a bundled WII-savings product to
attract women clients in the study area, and that a standalone
insurance plan holds the greatest prospects of survival, supporting
previous study in Ahmedabad, India examining the potential for
rainfall WII (cf. Stein and Tobacman, 2011).
Of all weather hazard options, most CE survey participants
preferred protection against inundation, suggesting that additional
work on WII targeted for Bangladesh’s coastal region should
address this risk in particular. The problem with the wind and hail
plans tested in this study is that these events can be quite localized.
Any relatively accurate (and potentially trusted) measurement of
these parameters would require both accurate weather stations
and their placement at an appropriate network density to detect
locally speciﬁc wind events within the farm landscape in which a
proposed WII scheme would be deployed. Unfortunately, the
Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) currently lacks
such a sufﬁciently dense network of observation points, though
efforts to increase the density of observation stations are currently
underway (ADB, 2013; Ahmed and Hasemann, 2013). While
additional research is needed to verify that skepticism of the
accuracy of meteorological reporting is why some of our
respondents did not favor wind or hail-based WII, the ﬁndings
of the follow-up study indicate that (at least for males) farmers’
choices were inﬂuenced by their concerns about basis risk and also
by a lack of conceptual clarity on how weather parameters could be
measured. In contrast, inundation-based WII may be a more
promising option because the spatial extent of ﬂooding and
consequent inundation is typically wider than hail or wind
damage, and linking inundation to a trigger (water level) is more
228 S. Akter et al. / Global Environmental Change 38 (2016) 217–229direct, and there are more river gauges than weather stations in
Bangladesh.
Nevertheless, several obstacles to developing such an inunda-
tion-based WII remain in terms of their underlying technical
aspects (e.g. spatial mapping via river gauge data interpolation, or
remote sensing to determine ﬂood depth and duration, or a
combination of both (cf. de Leeu et al., 2014). The study area is also
susceptible to excessive rain events which may cause waterlogging
damage in low-elevation areas independent of riverine ﬂoods (and
hence which may be poorly monitored by river gauges); thus, a
signiﬁcant source of basis risk remains to be addressed before
inundation-based WII schemes can be effectively deployed.
Further research is required to determine how much of the
observed low demand is related directly to gender, the WII product
itself (e.g. lack of conceptual understanding, complexity of the WII
plans, lack of trust in the implementing agency), and/or to the
method used to test it (e.g. unfamiliarity with, and/or complexity of
the choice experiment format). Nonetheless, it is clear that the
development of WII schemes deployed in this and similar risk-
prone coastal environments should consider greater emphasis on
assuring and strengthening the creditability of insuring institu-
tions, particularly as institutional trust levels vary between men
and women, while also undertaking efforts to strengthen women’s
ﬁnancial literacy, in order to more equitably reach women
beneﬁciaries.
6. Dedication and acknowledgements
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Paula Kantor who
worked widely in Bangladesh and Afghanistan researching the
intersection of agricultural development and gender. Dr. Kantor’s
life was tragically lost in a terrorist attack in Afghanistan in
2015 and represents a signiﬁcant loss to scientists working in these
ﬁelds. We gratefully acknowledge the ﬁnancial support of the Yale
Savings and Payments Research Fund at Innovations for Poverty
Action (IPA), sponsored by a grant from the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation (BMGF). We thank Dr. Sommarat Chantarat for her
contribution during the preliminary stage of this research, and Dr.
Samina Yasmin for assistance in coordinating ﬁeldwork. We also
thank Mohammad Ruhul Amin for his support in GIS, and the three
anonymous reviewers for their comments that improved the
manuscript. Part of this research was made possible by support
from the USAID Mission in Bangladesh through the Cereal Systems
Initiative for South Asia in Bangladesh (CSISA-BD) project, as well
as support from the Global Rice Science Partnership (GRiSP)
program under the Consultative Group on International Agricul-
tural Research (CGIAR), and Phase II of the Cereal Systems Initiative
for South Asia, funded by USAID and the BMGF. The content and
opinions resulting from this research are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reﬂect the views of IPA, BMGF, USAID, or the
United States Government, and shall not be used for advertising or
product endorsement purposes; nor do they reﬂect positions or
policies of the aforementioned organizations.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
gloenvcha.2016.03.010.
References
ADB (Asian Development Bank) (2013) Proposed Grant Assistance—People’s
Republic of Bangladesh: Pilot Project on Weather Index-Based Crop Insurance.
Asian Development Bank Grant Assistance report. Project number 46284.Ahmad, N., 2012. Gender and climate change in Bangladesh: the role of institutions
in reducing gender gaps in adaptation program. Social Development Working
Papers. Paper No. 126. The World Bank, Washington, DC.
Ahmed, T., Hasemann, A., 2013. Weather Index Insurance: Lessons Learned and Best
Practices for Bangladesh Workshop Report, 8–9 September 2013, Dhaka,
Bangladesh. WorldFish, Penang, Malaysia Workshop Report: 2013–66.
Ahmed, T., 2013. Scoping Report: Current Status of Index-based Insurance in
Bangladesh. WorldFish, Penang, Malaysia Project Report: 2013–38.
Akter, S., Basher, S.A., 2014. The impacts of food price and income shocks on
household food security and economic well-being: evidence from rural
Bangladesh. Global Environ. Change 25, 150–162.
Akter, S., Fatema, N., 2011. The role of microcredit and microinsurance in coping
with natural hazard risks. In 18th Annual conference of the European
association of environmental and resource economists, Rome, Italy, June 29–
July 2.
Akter, S., Mallick, B., 2013. The poverty–vulnerability–resilience nexus: evidence
from Bangladesh. Ecol. Econ. 96, 114–124.
Akter, S., Brouwer, R., Choudhury, S., Aziz, S., 2009. Is there a commercially viable
market for crop insurance in rural Bangladesh? Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Global
Change 14 (3), 215–229.
Akter, S., Brouwer, R., van Beukering, P.J., French, L., Silver, E., Choudhury, S., Aziz, S.
S., 2011. Exploring the feasibility of private micro ﬂood insurance provision in
Bangladesh. Disasters 35 (2), 287–307.
Akter, S., 2012. The role of microinsurance as a safety net against environmental
risks in Bangladesh. J. Environ. Dev. 21 (2), 263–280.
Ali, M.Y., Waddington, S.R., Timsina, J., Hodson, D., Dixon, J., 2009. Maize-rice
cropping systems in Bangladesh-status and research need. J. Agric. Sci.Technol.
3 (6), 35–53.
Andrews, R.L., Currim, I.S., 2003. Retention of latent segments in regression-based
marketing models. Int. J. Res. Market. 20 (4), 315–321.
Arora, M., Kumari, S., 2015. Risk taking in ﬁnancial decisions as a function of age:
gender: mediating role of loss aversion and regret. Int. J. Appl. Psychol. 5 (4), 83–
89.
BBS (angladesh Bureau of Statistics), 2011. Report on Labour Force Survey 2010.
Statistics and Informatics Division, Ministry of Planning. Government of the
People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka.
Bangladesh Bank, 2015. Interest rate. Economic Data and Economic Statistics. .
(accessed 15.06.15) https://www.bangladesh-bank.org/econdata/intrate.php.
Baumgärtner, S., Quaas, M.F., 2009. Agro-biodiversity as natural insurance and the
development of ﬁnancial insurance markets. In: Kontoleon, A., Pascual, U.,
Smale, M. (Eds.), Agrobiodiversity, Conservation and Economic Development.
Routledge, London, pp. 293–317.
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2008. Gender Impact Strategy for Agricultural
Development. Gate Foundation, Seattle the USA.
Binswanger-Mkhize, H.P., 2012. Is there too much hype about index-based
agricultural insurance? J. Dev. Stud. 48, 187–200.
Birol, E., Villalba, E.R., Smale, M., 2009. Farmer preferences for milpa diversity and
genetically modiﬁed maize in Mexico: a latent class approach. Environ. Dev.
Econ. 14 (4), 521.
Bliemer, M.C., Rose, J.M., Hess, S., 2008. Approximation of Bayesian efﬁciency in
experimental choice designs. J. Choice Modell. 1 (1), 98–126.
Brouwer, R., Akter, S., 2010. Informing micro insurance contract design to mitigate
climate change catastrophe risks using choice experiments. Environ. Hazards 9
(1), 74–88.
Carter, de Janvry, A., Sadoulet, E., A, 2014. Index-based weather insurance for
developing countries: A review of evidence and a set of propositions for up-
scalingBackground document for the workshop: Microﬁnance products for
weather risk management in developing countries: State of the arts and
perspectives . . (accessed 08.01.16) http://www.ferdi.fr/sites/www.ferdi.fr/ﬁles/
evenements/presentations/
wp_ferdi_working_paper_on_index_insurance_june_19_kl.pdf.
Caussade, S., de Dios Ortúzar, J., Rizzi, L.I., Hensher, D.A., 2005. Assessing the
inﬂuence of design dimensions on stated choice experiment estimates. Transp.
Res. Part B 39 (7), 621–640.
Clark, R.L., Mitchell, O.S., 2014. How does retiree health insurance inﬂuence public
sector employee saving? J. Health Econ. 38, 109–118.
Clarke, D.J., Grenham, D., 2013. Microinsurance and natural disasters: challenges
and options. Environ. Sci. Policy 27, S89–S98.
Cole, S., Giné, X., Tobacman, J., Townsend, R., Topalova, P., Vickery, J., 2013. Barriers to
household risk management: evidence from India. Am. Econ. J.-Appl. Econ. 5 (1),
104–135.
Collier, B., Skees, J., Barnett, B., 2009. Weather index insurance and climate change:
opportunities and challenges in lower income countries. Geneva Pap. Risk
Insurance-Issues Pract. 34 (3), 401–424.
Croson, R., Gneezy, U., 2009. Gender differences in preferences. J. Econ. Lit. 448–474.
Cummings, R.G., Taylor, L.O., 1999. Unbiased value estimates for environmental
goods: a cheap talk design for the contingent valuation method. Am. Econ. Rev. 3
(89), 649–665.
Delavallade, C., Dizon, F., Hill, R.V., Petraud, J.P., 2015. Managing Risk with Insurance
and Savings: Experimental Evidence for Male and Female Farm Managers in
West Africa. Working Paper No. 1426. International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI), Washington DC.
Eckel, C.C., Grossman, P.J., 2002. Sex differences and statistical stereotyping in
attitudes toward ﬁnancial risk. Evol. Hum. Behav. 23 (4), 281–295.
Eckel, C.C., Grossman, P.J., 2008. Men, women and risk aversion: experimental
evidence. Handb. Exp. Econ. Results 1, 1061–1073.
S. Akter et al. / Global Environmental Change 38 (2016) 217–229 229Eckel, C.C., Wilson, R.K., 2004. Is trust a risky decision? J. Econ. Behav. Organiz. 55
(4), 447–465.
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations), 2011. The State of
Food and Agriculture 2010–2011: Women in Agriculture: Closing the Gender
Gap for Development. FAO, Rome.
Fletschner, D., Kenney, L., 2014. Rural women’s access to ﬁnancial services: credit,
savings, and insurance. In: Quisumbing, A.R., Meinzen-Dick, R., Raney, T.L.,
Croppenstedt, A., Behrman, J.A., Peterman, A. (Eds.), Gender in Agriculture.
Springer, Netherlands.
Giné, X., Townsend, R., Vickery, J., 2008. Patterns of rainfall insurance participation
in rural India. World Bank Econ. Rev. 22 (3), 539–566.
Hanley, N., Mourato, S., Wright, R.E., 2001. Choice modelling approaches: a superior
alternative for environmental valuation? J. Econ. Surv. 15 (3), 435–462.
Hung, A., Yoong, J., Brown, E., 2012. Empowering women through ﬁnancial
awareness and educationOECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and
Private Pensions, No. 14. OECD Publishing. . (accessed 16.06.15) http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/5k9d5v6kh56g-en.
IPCC, 2012. In: Field, C.B., Barros, V., Stocker, T.F., Qin, D., Dokken, D.J., Ebi, K.L.,
Mastrandrea, M.D., Mach, K.J., Plattner, G.-K., Allen, S.K., Tignor, M., Midgley, P.
M. (Eds.), Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance
Climate Change Adaptation. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA, pp. 582.
Johnson, L., 2013. Index insurance and the articulation of risk-bearing subjects.
Environ. Plann. A 45, 2663–2681.
Kelkar, G., 2009. The feminization of agriculture in Asia: Implications for women’s
agency and productivity. United Nations Development Fund for Women
(UNIFEM) South-Asia Regional Ofﬁce, New Delhi.
Müller, B., Quaas, M.F., Frank, K., Baumgärtner, S., 2011. Pitfalls and potential of
institutional change: rain-index insurance and the sustainability of rangeland
management. Ecolog. Econ. 70 (11), 2137–2144.
MOA, FAO, 2013. Master Plan for Agricultural Development in the Southern Region
of Bangladesh. Ministry of Agriculture (MoA, Government of Bangladesh) and
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Dhaka, Bangladesh, pp. 122.McFadden, D., 1974. The measurement of urban travel demand. J. Public Econ. 3 (4),
303–328.
Olbrich, R., Quaas, M.F., Haensler, A., Baumgärtner, S., 2012. Risk preferences under
heterogeneous environmental risk. Working Paper Series in Economics No. 208.
University of Lüneburg (Available at SSRN 1904315).
Quaas, M.F., Baumgärtner, S., 2008. Natural vs. ﬁnancial insurance in the
management of public-good ecosystems. Ecol. Econ. 65 (2), 397–406.
Rossi, F., Carter, D.R., Alavalapati, J.R., Nowak, J.T., 2011. Assessing landowner
preferences for forest management practices to prevent the southern pine
beetle: an attribute-based choice experiment approach. For. Policy Econ. 13,
234–241.
Sraboni, E., Quisumbing, A.R., Ahmed, A.U., 2013. The women’s empowerment in
agriculture index: Results from the 2011–2012 Bangladesh Integrated
Household Survey. Project Report submitted to the US Agency for International
Development. International Food Policy Research Institute, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Stein, D., Tobacman, J., 2011. Weather insured savings accounts London School of
Economics Working Paper. . (accessed 05.03.15) http://personal.lse.ac.uk/stein/
WISA9-21.pdf.
WEDO (Women’s Environment and Development Organization), 2008. Gender,
climate change, and human security: Lessons from Bangladesh, Ghana, and
Senegal. . (accessed 11.12.15) http://www.wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/hsn-
studyﬁnal-may-20-2008.pdf.
Wedel, M., Kamakura, W.A., 2002. Mixture regression models. In: Hagenaars, J.A.,
McCutcheon, A.L. (Eds.), Applied Latent Class Analysis. Cambridge University
Press, New York, pp. 366–383.
World Bank, 2015. Index-Insurance: Protecting Women Farmers against Weather
Risk. Feature Story, March 6, 2015. . (accessed 24.05.15) http://www.worldbank.
org/en/news/feature/2015/03/06/index-insurance-protecting-women-
farmers-against-weather-risk.
de Leeu, J., Vrieling, W., She, A., Atzberger, C., Hadgu, K.M., Biradar, C.M., Keah, H.,
Turvey, C., 2014. The potential and uptake of remote sensing in insurance: a
review. Remote Sens. 6 (11), 10888–10912.
